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Abstract 
This article discusses the relations between the French, Portuguese and Spanish socialist parties 
during the transitions to democracy in the Iberian Peninsula (1974-1977). It focuses on the attempt 
of these parties to establish a distinctive ideological trend, Southern European Socialism. The main 
argument is that the French socialists attempted to promote their ideological line—and predominantly 
the union between socialists and communists—in the Iberian Peninsula during the transitions to 
democracy. The Portuguese PS and the Spanish PSOE initially considered following this line. 
However, the radicalisation of the Portuguese Revolution in the sensitive context of Cold War 
détente, as well as the involvement of the European social democrats in both Portugal and Spain 
against the union of the left, prevented this model from being further considered by the PS and the 
PSOE. Nevertheless, all these parties showed interest in promoting a common Southern European 
Socialist identity that differed from European social democracy as well as from Soviet communism, 
considering it useful in the struggle for hegemony within the left. 
The aim of this article is to analyse the relations between the French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste: 
PSF) and its Iberian counterparts the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español: PSOE) and the Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista: PS) in the mid-1970s, when 
both Spain and Portugal shifted from dictatorships to democracies. Focusing on the Portuguese 
Revolution and the Spanish transition, this article will examine the emergence and partial decline of 
the idea of Southern European Socialism,i and the ideological and political relevance that this trend, 
promoted by the PSF, had for all of these parties. The analysis here is based on documents held at the 
historical archive of the PSF,ii complemented by documents placed in the historical archives of the 
PSOE,iii documents available online from the Mário Soares Foundation and published sources. 
In the last two decades scholars of the Spanish and Portuguese transitions to democracy have paid 
particular attention to international factors. They have highlighted the role of the European social 
democrat governments and parties in promoting democracy in the Iberian Peninsula. iv Following this 
trend, historians working on Iberian socialism have considered international factors in order to 
explain how the PS and PSOE could play such a prominent role during the changes of regime in 
Portugal and Spain.v They have demonstrated the particular significance of the involvement of 
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German social democracy and the British labour movement in the Iberian Peninsula, which not only 
favoured the establishment of a Western kind of democracy in Portugal and Spain, but also benefited 
the socialist parties politically, organisationally and financially, as well as contributing to their 
ideological moderation. 
The relevance of the connections between the German, British and Iberian socialists has 
overshadowed the relations between the PSOE, PS and other European parties. Furthermore, it has 
favoured the creation of a narrative that considers social democracy to be a uniform unit of analysis, 
which could be misleading considering the ideological and political diversity that coexisted in the 
Socialist International (SI) in the 1970s.vi This perspective has been nuanced in recent years, however. 
New research is widening the scope to include the Scandinavian social democratsvii and the French 
Socialist Partyviii among the relevant international actors involved in the Iberian transitions. 
Although political scientists have studied the French, Iberian, Italian and Greek socialists as a 
distinctive group, differentiated from Northern social democracy, since the late 1970s, ix historians 
have not considered this distinction until recently, after the re-emergence of the North–South 
European dichotomy after the 2008 crisis. Approaching the divide between Northern and Southern 
European socialism, José Magone and to some extent Antonio Peciccia have recently studied the 
ideological transformation of the PS and its political behaviour during the Carnation Revolution in 
terms of these two trends, noticing the appeal of the Southern European Socialist tendency, 
represented by the PSF, for the PS.x Christian Salmxi and Bernd Rotherxii have also noticed this 
division when analysing how European social democrats shaped the EC’s southern enlargement. A 
step forward in this direction, in interpretative terms and in terms of the use of primary sources, are 
the works of Fadi Kassem, and although it is less directly connected to the Iberian transitions, Michele 
Di Donato. Connecting the history of European socialism to the challenges of Euro-communism, Di 
Donato foregrounds the relevant issue of the socialist search for a differentiated identity in the 
1970s.xiii Kassem in turn considers Southern European Socialism to have been a tool at the service of 
the ideological and political ambitions of PSF nationally as well as internationally. His work suggests 
that the relevance of this trend might have been greater than previously assumed for explaining both 
the electoral successes of Southern European socialist parties in the 1980s, and for rebalancing the 
forces between socialists and communists in Southern Europe.xiv All of this leaves open the question 
of how important this trend was for the Iberian and French parties ideologically, politically and in 
terms of defining a differentiated identity. 
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Building on this scholarship, this article aims to answer this question by analysing the relations 
between the PSF, PSOE and PS during 1974–6 in the contexts of the change in regime on the Iberian 
Peninsula, competition between socialists and communists in Southern Europe and Cold War détente. 
The main argument is that the French socialists attempted to promote their ideological line –
predominantly the union of the left – on the Iberian Peninsula during the transitions to democracy. 
Their objectives were to seek international validation for their strategy of uniting the left, to exert 
influence on the PS and PSOE, and thereby build a Southern European bloc within the SI that could 
counterbalance the influence of Northern social democracy within the context of increasing 
international interdependence, and to help these parties during the transitions to democracy.  
It is argued, then, that PS and PSOE initially considered following the French strategy. They needed 
to create foundations for building governments of national unity, which was theoretically a 
requirement for post-authoritarian transitions to democracy, and at the same time, they faced 
competition from strong communist parties, which made it necessary for them to find a strategy to 
deal with the communists without being engulfed. In France, the PS and PSOE found an example for 
developing competitive cooperation with the communists, which seemed to be especially fruitful for 
the socialists. They never adopted this model, however, due to the radicalisation of the Portuguese 
Revolution within the sensitive context of Cold War détente. In addition, the most relevant European 
social democrat parties were opposed to the union of the left in both Portugal and Spain. In the case 
of the PSOE, domestic factors, such as the traumatic memory of the consequences for the popular 
front in the 1930s, and the difficult socialist–communist relations during the Civil War,xv also worked 
against the adoption of this model, as did the nature of the transition, controlled by the regime. 
Finally, it is demonstrated here that these factors worked in two directions. They also contributed to 
the change in the PSF’s priorities in Portugal and to the reconsideration of its international strategy. 
Nevertheless, the French, Portuguese and Spanish socialist parties showed interest in promoting a 
common identity – that of radical socialists situated ideologically far from the reformist European 
social democracy as well as from Soviet communism – as they perceived it useful in their struggle 
for hegemony within the left.  
International Context and the Western European Left in the Early 1970s 
At the beginning of the 1970s several international events affected the evolution of the political left 
in Western Europe. The relative loss of international prestige of both the United States and the Soviet 
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Union due to their involvement in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, respectively, together with the 
international relaxation brought about by superpower and intra-European détente, created a climate 
that facilitated the ideological distancing of some Western European communist parties from 
Moscowxvi and increasing contact between socialists and communists. This happened in a moment of 
increasing international interconnectedness or globalisation that tended to grip the main international 
and transnational actors collectively.xvii Moreover, the beginning of this decade witnessed the 
electoral improvement of social democrat parties in several West European countries,xviii a new phase 
in European integration and the emergence of an international economic crisis caused by the 
combination of the oil shock of 1973 and the restructuration of the international monetary system. 
This crisis eroded the social democratic principle of promoting social equality through the 
redistribution of the surplus of capitalist growth (halted during the mid-1970s) precisely when many 
of these parties faced governmental responsibilities. 
In this context, the French socialists renewed their organisation as well as their ideological line.xix 
This was in response to national factors that interacted with the abovementioned international factors. 
The socialists coexisted with a strong communist party (PCF), and in the frame of the French Fifth 
Republic’s semi-presidential system the divided left had problems reaching power. Moreover, 
radicalisation after May ’68 and the crisis of post-war political culture led to the socialists’ leftward 
shift. The key elements that characterised the new trend of the PS were the adoption of the concept 
self-management (autogestion)xx as a way of deepening democracy and combining it with socialism, 
the uniting of socialists and communists, and the final aim of breaking with capitalism. This renewal 
aimed at allowing the left to reach power in France, advancing towards socialism in freedom and 
changing the balance of power within the left in favour of the socialists.  
However, these ideological elements were at odds with the key characteristics of post-war social 
democracy –the acceptance of regulated capitalism and strong anti-communism. In the 1950s and 
1960s anti-communism had been built into the ideological basis of the SI, and the French Union of 
the Left in 1972xxi introduced fundamental changes to the International that were not welcomed by 
its member parties.xxii Although the SI accepted the PSF,xxiii its strategy was isolated within the 
organisation, and the International kept rejecting any ideological concession to communism.xxiv While 
in this precarious position, the PSF sought to counterbalance the ideological predominance of 
Germanic social democracy within the SI, and influencing the PS and PSOE ideologically was one 
way of furthering this agenda.xxv 
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At the beginning of the 1970s the socialist parties in the Iberian Peninsula also experienced deep 
transformations that brought them closer to the PSF. In Spain, the outlawed PSOE renewed its 
organisation and updated its ideological line between 1972 and 1974.xxvi After a process of organic 
renovation that split the party,xxvii the PSOE committed itself to the concept of democratic rupturexxviii 
and to the rupture with capitalism, and promoted a new image – that of a party well-placed in the left, 
far from the reformist Western European social democracy and from the socialism that existed in 
Eastern Europe.xxix Moreover, it considered establishing closer relations with the communists in order 
to overthrow the dictatorship.xxx The Portuguese PS was created in 1973 in Bad Münstereifel. It 
inherited the organisation of the former Portuguese Socialist Action (Acção Socialista Portuguesa)xxxi 
led by Mário Soares and updated its ideology and programme with the establishment of socialism in 
Portugal being the ultimate aim of the party.xxxii Similar to the PSOE, the PS claimed to ‘repudiate’ 
social democracy for having accepted capitalism, and it also rejected the bureaucratic and totalitarian 
models of Eastern Europe.xxxiii The Portuguese found a new cornerstone for their new kind of 
socialism in the concept of autogesão and advocated the union of the Portuguese left in order to better 
fight against dictatorship. The party considered that the most appropriate way to achieve socialism in 
Portugal would be a democratic path like the one ‘praised by the Chilean Popular Union or the French 
[Union of the Left]’.xxxiv In fact, sponsored by the PSF, the Portuguese socialists tried to establish a 
pact with the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português; PCP) in Paris twice before 
the revolution, with meagre results due to the PCP’s reluctance.xxxv  
 
The Carnation Revolution, A New Way to Socialism in Western Europe? 
The coup led by the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas; MFA)xxxvi that put 
an end to the Estado Novo in Portugal on 25 April 1974 became almost immediately a social 
revolution.xxxvii The French socialists realised then that Portugal could offer optimal conditions for 
moving towards socialism. Taking into account the socio-economic crisis and the backwardness of 
the Iberian country, they considered that ‘Portugal does not only need a political revolution. It also 
needs a social and economic revolution’.xxxviii Moreover, the events in Portugal, where socialists and 
communists took part in the provisional government, presented the PSF with an exceptional 
opportunity to test their ideas on how to reach power and advance towards socialism.xxxix  
The possibilities that opened up in the Iberian country, together with the PSF’s ascendancy over the 
PS, led the French socialists to believe that they could internationally validate their domestic strategy. 
Thus, in the first stages of the revolution the French tried to promote the union of the left in Portugal. 
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They considered that only a union between socialists and communists could ensure a new way of 
marching towards socialism, a way in which freedom and democracy would be respected.xl They also 
thought that only this union would be able to restrain the possible actions of the reactionary forces. 
Moreover, this strategy could benefit the Portuguese socialists, as they could take advantage of the 
organisational strength of the communists, while making the most of the almost fifty years of 
Salazar’s anti-communist propaganda.xli Furthermore, a powerful reason for the French to promote 
the union of the left in Portugal was the certainty that this strategy was the preferred one among 
Portuguese socialists. The PSF believed that the ‘PS . . . playing to the full the union of the left, 
wishes, like PC[P], to subscribe to a dynamic relationship à la française, of which they have high 
expectations’.xlii Finally, for the French socialists, spreading their ideological influence in Portugal 
would also mean an opportunity to strengthen their international position within the SI.  
In June 1974 the leader of the PS, Mário Soares, invited Mitterrand to visit Portugal. It was the first 
important international visit to the new Portugal, and it afforded the PS project a good deal of 
publicity and leftist credibility. This was very important for the PS within the revolutionary context. 
As capitalism was generally associated with the old regime, a common trait of all of the Portuguese 
left-wing parties was anti-capitalism; being identified with French socialism was valuable for 
projecting the desired radical image.xliii Indeed, several members of the PS executive emphasised their 
party’s attachment to the French ideological trend.xliv According to Vasco da Gama Fernandes, 
Mitterrand ‘is an example for us . . . because he was able to unite the left in the common fight against 
the wrong kinds of progress’. In the same vein, Antonio Reis stated that ‘Mitterrand is the secretary 
general of a socialist party whose ideological orientation is very close to ours. . . . Besides, Mitterrand 
is disposed towards working with us and he promises to ensure all necessary assistance from his 
party.’xlv   
Once in Lisbon Mitterrand employed explicitly anti-capitalist rhetoric in his speech at a socialist rally. 
He encouraged the Portuguese to march towards socialism, and he advised them to do this according 
to the French strategy – by uniting all the forces of the left.xlvi After the rally the leaders of the PSF 
and PS held a meeting where they decided to strengthen the links between their parties. The French 
would give the Portuguese socialists political, ideological and technical support with the intention of 
allowing them to establish an alliance with the communists from which they could profit. They 
assumed that such an alliance would help both parties carry out a transition to socialism that would 
be able to contain the Portuguese conservatives and the reactionary forces. Then, if the calendar 
proposed by the MFA was respected, the PSF predicted that in the upcoming elections of 1975 the 
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PS would probably achieve better results than the PCP and could thereby lead the transition towards 
socialism in democracy.xlvii 
However, the revolutionary process changed after September 1974, when the Portuguese President 
António de Spínola resigned due to the social and political pressure against his plan to implement a 
presidential system. From October onwards the locus of the political struggle shifted to an intra-left 
conflict, with the main contenders being the PS, PCP and a divided MFA. The main issue at stake 
was no longer whether the objective of the revolution was socialism but rather what kind of socialism 
should be implanted. In December the PS held a Congress at which the party suffered a split: the 
section that was more committed to the union of the left separated from the PS.xlviii In January 1975 
the disagreements between socialists and communists intensified when the latter tried to pass a law 
to impose a single central union organisation under their control.xlix 
The increasing tension between the PS and PCP was an obstacle to the strategy of the French socialists 
in Portugal. However, although PSF were concerned about the attitude of PCP,l their public stance 
with regard to the revolution did not change. They downplayed the quarrel within the Portuguese left 
and maintained their support for its union. li The problems between the PS and PCP arrived at a 
moment when the PSF was being criticised by the communists in France for being a centrist, reformist 
party that only sought electoral profit from the common programme of the left.lii Moreover, at this 
point the PSF was redefining its strategy and its internal organisation at the Congress of Pau (January–
February 1975), where the Centre for Socialist Education and Research (Centre d'Etudes, de 
Recherches et d'Education Socialistes: CERES), the faction of PSF most committed to the union of 
the left and rupture with capitalism, temporarily lost influence within the party. liii The PSF tried to 
minimise domestic criticism by supporting the union of the left in Portugal and by omitting publicly 
their concerns about the PCP’s attitude.  
At the Congress of Pau, the PSF likewise sanctioned the decision to internationalise its struggle. The 
party delineated an international project of spreading ideological influence over the socialist parties 
of the Mediterranean, and more concretely in Southern Europe, where ‘a particularly spirited 
solidarity inspired our relations with the Spanish and Portuguese socialists’.liv It considered that ‘this 
is the opportunity for the PS[F] to express [without hesitation] their political, moral and material 
support to the socialist and progressive parties of these countries’.lv  
However, the project of the PSF would face further obstacles in Portugal, as other issues embittered 
the relations between the PS and PCP, making mutual understanding increasingly difficult. One of 
these issues was holding the elections for the Constituent Assembly and their political significance. 
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The Portuguese socialists were very interested in these elections because they expected a favourable 
result, which could help them to gain control over the revolution. The communists, in turn, wanted 
to postpone the elections, arguing that after almost fifty years of a dictatorship, the Church and the 
right-wing parties still could easily manipulate the people, especially in the north of the country and 
in the islands. For this reason they felt that Portugal was not ready for completely free democratic 
elections.lvi This issue became even more problematic after 11 March, when right-wing forces led by 
former President Spínola attempted a coup d’état. The attempt failed, and the most leftist elements of 
the MFA, with the support of the PCP, used it as an argument to strengthen their positions within the 
state apparatus with the creation of a Council of the Revolution. The banks and insurance companies 
were nationalised, and agrarian reform was begun with the expropriations of lands. A month later the 
MFA, again backed by PCP, used its strengthened position to make the participation of the political 
parties in the elections conditional on the signature of a pact that limited the competencies and 
autonomy of future governments. Although the PS was against this initiative, they signed the pact 
because of the moral and political legitimacy that a good electoral result could provide them. lvii 
In this context, Antoine Blanca, the PSF’s expert on the Iberian Peninsula, visited Portugal from 21 
to 22 March to assess the situation. He met privately with Soares, who expressed his concern about 
the intentions of the PCP, allied with the military, to implant a popular democracy in Portugal. 
According to Soares, the determination of the communists to do this made it very difficult for the PS 
to follow the strategy of the union of the left in Portugallviii.  
The pessimistic view of the situation given by Soares caused concern in the PSF, as the possibility of 
Portugal drifting towards communism seemed real. Moreover, this implied that the Portuguese 
socialists were no longer willing to consider collaboration with the communists, which obliged the 
French to rethink their strategy in Portugal. This time, the response of the PSF leadership was to keep 
supporting the PS and to start criticising the PCP publicly. In their statements, they began to 
emphasise the socialists’ commitment to democracy– – a key concept without which socialism would 
make no sense for the leaders of the PSF – freedom and the revolution, while questioning the PCP’s 
commitment to these same goals.lix  
However, events evolved quickly in Portugal. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held 
on the 25 April 1975. The PS was the party with the most votes, achieving 37.9 per cent. The moderate 
Democratic People’s Party (Partido Popular Democrático: PPD)lx came second with 26.4 per cent, 
and the PCP came in third with 12,5 per cent. These positive results temporarily changed the PSF’s 
interpretation of the Portuguese situation. Again, they considered that the alliance between socialists 
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and communists could be advisable and fruitful for the PS. They thought that after the electoral 
victory the PS could exploit their success and try to overcome Portugal’s social, political and 
economic difficulties. The communists would have a part to play in this endeavour, but the PS would 
take the lead in the revolutionary process. Thus, the PS could still save both the revolution and 
democracy. The PSF was also aware that the future of the revolution depended on the acceptance of 
the electoral results by the military. Thus, they considered that the PS had to convince the MFA of 
their commitment to establishing a new society.lxi 
 
Building Southern European Socialism 
While the situation in Portugal was perhaps the PSF’s main area of international interest, they also 
reinforced their attention on neighbouring Spain in 1975. At that moment Franco was ill, and his 
imminent demise was clear to everyone, opening the door to political change in the country. The 
Spanish opposition were in a relatively similar situation to their counterparts in pre-revolutionary 
Portugal. There was a strong and well-organised communist party (Partido Comunista de España: 
PCE), and the Spanish socialists were weaker and factionalised, with the main party being the 
PSOE.lxii Since its renovation in 1972,lxiii PSOE had moved its executive committee from France to 
Spain and was in the process of renewing its ideology in a direction that aligned them closely to the 
PSF. In this context, the French saw the possibility to also spread their influence to Spain. 
Between 1972 and 1974 the renovated PSOE displayed its interest in the model outlined by the PSF 
several times in its official newspaper. Initially, they viewed the model as an example that, when 
taken together with the Chilean socialist experience, showed that the process of international détente 
opened up new possibilities for the left in the West.lxiv This was of interest to them as it seemed to 
legitimise collaboration with the PCE for overthrowing the Spanish dictatorship. However, after the 
dramatic downfall of Salvador Allende’s government in Chile, and after the positive results of the 
PSF in the 1973 legislative and 1974 presidential elections of France, the PSOE more clearly defined 
its position regarding the union of the left. In 1974 the Spanish party considered this strategy to be an 
inspiring model that could be adapted to Spain to fight against the dictatorship and could allow the 
party to profit from the greater strength and grassroots support of the PCE. However, they did not 
want to repeat traumatic past experiences. Therefore, they focused more on the French experiment 
than on the Chilean one. Furthermore, they presented the French case as ‘an experience practically 
without precedent’,lxv framing it differently to the popular fronts of the 1930s – which had left a 
lingering memory that warned against collaboration between socialists and communists in Spain. To 
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make this difference clear, the PSOE stressed the fact that the parties signatory to the ‘union of the 
left’ (union de la gauche) had kept their independence and autonomy. Although the PSOE was 
divided over the issue of how to relate to the communists,lxvi at its thirteenth congress in exile 
(Suresnes, October 1974), it decided to cooperate with all other anti-Francoist forces, especially those 
on the left. Moreover, the congress granted the Executive Committee led by Felipe González total 
freedom to conduct the negotiations with the PCE. 
François Mitterrand was the most significant international guest at the congress. He delivered a 
speech based on two key ideas: that class struggle was the engine of history, with socialists and 
communists being on the same side of this struggle, and that in the context of détente and economic 
international crisis it was necessary to internationalise the struggle of the socialist parties, which 
implied greater collaboration between the PSF and PSOE, as well as between these parties and others. 
He argued for greater collaboration between the Southern European socialist parties as follows:  
it is essential to recover the issues and methods for the internationalisation of the our struggle. 
. . . We are training our militants with the aim that they will get to know you, that they will 
organise meetings with you. . . . We will help you . . . this includes many fields: the economic 
[field], which is always difficult, but possible, the organisational and the educational [fields], 
the technical [field], with public meetings: by the way, we have to organise public debates in 
1975 . . . in which the leaders of Spanish, Portuguese, French and Italian socialism could meet, 
not with the aim to realise a, let’s say, Latin union, but because we are about to go through 
unique experiences, and it is in Europe where this new strategy of the union of the left has just 
been born, with the expectation that the socialists, who refuse to be included in social 
democracy . . . work for the total union of workers.lxvii 
Mitterrand’s speech galvanised the Spanish socialists, as he expressed his desire to build closer 
relations and a common strategy between the socialist parties of Southern Europe. Soon after the 
congress, in December 1974, the new leaders of the PSOE met with the leaders of the PSF in Paris. 
Both parties agreed to ‘intensify their relations in every field, especially in education and the 
exchange of information’. In the former field both parties had already collaborated before, with 
positive results according to the Spanish participants.lxviii  Furthermore, Mitterrand publicly showed 
his support for PSOE, considering it as ‘the only qualified representative of socialism in Spain’, lxix 
which was very important for the Spanish party as it had to face competition from several other 
socialist groups. 
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Some weeks later, in January 1975, the parties began to collaborate on the education of the PSOE’s 
members. Francisco Bustelo of the PSOE and Lionel Jospin of the PSF, who served as the training 
secretaries for the parties, met in Paris and decided to establish a copy service for both of their 
publications. They also decided that a member of the PSOE would spend two to eight days at the 
headquarters of the PSF. This would allow him or her to become familiar with how the French party 
worked in practice. The Spanish party also asked the French if they could provide a venue for the 
organisation of training courses in May and August, at which PSOE militants living in Spain and in 
exile could improve their theoretical awareness. lxx The formation of the PSOE’s cadres was urgent 
for the party leaders, as they feared that when the PSOE were legalised a crowd of opportunists could 
benefit from the democratic structures of the party and end up weakening its commitment to building 
socialism in Spain.lxxi 
 
Social Democracy versus Southern European Socialism 
In the spring of 1975 the ideological division within the Socialist International that had been gathering 
momentum in the previous years found a front line in the Iberian Peninsula. The PS and PSOE became 
the battlefield for two different conceptualisations of democratic socialism: Southern European 
Socialism represented by the PSF, and social democracy represented by the SPD.lxxii The French were 
well aware of this struggle,lxxiii but they were rather surprised by the fierce reaction of the German 
social democrats to their attempt at strengthening bilateral and ideological links with the Spanish and 
Portuguese socialists. This, the French thought, brought about the ‘hardening of the German Social 
Democratic party . . . with regard to the French PS’.lxxiv  
Despite the diversity of views existing among the Western countries on how to respond to the 
situation in Portugal,lxxv from March on the West European social democrat parties and governments, 
working through both official and informal channels, intensified their collaboration in order to 
provide the leaders of the PS with support and guidance. Their aim was to promote the establishment 
of liberal democracy in Portugal and counteract the influence of the communists in the revolution. 
The Portuguese events concerned all of the Western powers,lxxvi in Europe especially the Federal 
Republic of Germany, because the increasing influence of the PCP in the government – and the 
possible contagion effect on the other Southern European countries – put their understandings of 
détentelxxvii at risk just months before the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
would take place in Helsinki.lxxviii This led the German social democrats to try to influence the 
ideology of the PS, thereby preventing them from taking the ideological development and strategy of 
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the PSF as ‘universal remedies’ for Portugal.lxxix Similarly, early in May, the German social 
democrats decided to provide the PSOE with ‘all the support imaginable’ to help them to become the 
main party of the Spanish left, thus counterbalancing communist influence on the Spanish working 
class.lxxx In the same vein, the Germans tried to counteract the French strategy of uniting the left in 
Spain.lxxxi  
At the same time, working in the opposite direction, Mitterrand set the Conference of the Socialist 
Parties of Southern Europe in motion. To prepare for the conference, he invited the leaders of the 
Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Belgian socialist parties to spend a working weekend at his 
home in Latche, in southwestern France. The main objective of this informal meeting was to debate, 
exchange experiences and, if possible, reach a common stance on how to relate to the communists of 
Southern Europe. Thus, during the months that followed Iberian socialists were exposed to the 
conflicting influences of their European counterparts. They responded to this experience by using, 
adopting and adapting some of the conceptual and material transfers received from the European 
social democrats, as well as from the French.  
The meeting of Southern European socialists in Latche took place on 23 and 24 May, and the 
discussions included national as well as international topics. However, the Portuguese situation was 
more extensively discussed, as the PS was finding it difficult to take advantage of its positive electoral 
results in Portugal, whereas the PCP was gaining influence in the state apparatus. On the first day in 
Latche, the Portuguese party representative Medeiros Ferreira let their Southern European fellow 
socialists know that in the current circumstances, the PS considered it impossible to establish a pact 
with the PCP. Moreover, the Portuguese socialists were concerned with the role that the military 
could play in the revolution after the elections, as a section of the MFA was reluctant to accept the 
political significance that the PS was ascribing to the electoral results.lxxxii On 24 May Mário Soares 
arrived in Latche. In his presentation he held the PCP responsible for the failure of the union of the 
left in Portugal, and he emphasised that an agreement of this kind would be impossible because the 
‘PCP wants to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat’. In this situation, the PS proposed an 
alternative way of action for reversing the situation that would be presented at the Portuguese 
Constituent Assembly. This would consist of the encouragement and protection of the private sector, 
the return of technocrats to the government and a request for European aid. lxxxiii Soares thought that 
European support would be crucial for fighting for hegemony with the PCP. Considering Portugal’s 
critical economic situation, he argued that the socialists would have to ‘encourage private initiative, 
to facilitate the investments and to get credits from Western Europe’.lxxxiv At the political level, ‘the 
military was sensitive to the pressures coming from Europe’. A further way of pressuring the PCP, 
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something in which the socialists of Southern Europe could be very helpful for the PS, was demanding 
that the communist parties of these European countries – especially the PCIlxxxv and the PCF – refuse 
to support the PCP. He considered that ‘PCF is going to be upset [but they] cannot defend freedom 
here [in France] and Cunhal in Lisbon’.lxxxvi 
The Spanish situation was also touched upon during these two days of discussions. Felipe González 
presented the PSOE’s interpretation of the Spanish state of affairs to his colleagues. After explaining 
what he named ‘the insoluble crisis of the Spanish regime’, he remarked that there was a problem 
shared by all of the Spanish opposition: the socialists, communists and Christian democrats were each 
very factionalised. Moreover, the Basque and Catalan nationalists were part of the equation. 
According to González, ‘the conjunction of these currents was difficult’, especially because of the 
divergent tactics followed by the PSOE and PCE. The communists had reached an agreement with 
the right in the Junta Democrática,lxxxvii while the PSOE thought that the political change had to come 
from the permanent mobilisation of the workers. The Spanish socialists were interested in some kind 
of agreement with the communists, but so far they had failed, the main reason being that the PCE 
always wanted to negotiate within the frame of the Junta. The PSOE rejected the Junta, not only 
because of its interclass composition but also because joining it would imply making a pact with the 
communists from a subaltern position.lxxxviii  
Regarding the options for the time after Franco, González foresaw three possible scenarios. The first 
one was the return to fascism and oppression. The deterioration of the situation in Portugal could 
favour the reactionaries in Spain. The second scenario would be controlled liberalisation led by Prince 
Juan Carlos. The third scenario would be democratic rupture, as praised by the opposition. 
Democratic rupture could entail a violent confrontation, which was not desirable. Thus, the PSOE 
needed to find a mediator within the regime in order to negotiate a way out of the dictatorship without 
violence. However, they were finding it difficult to find such a person.lxxxix It is important to note that 
the French socialists could not help the Spanish with this issue, as they could not use governmental 
channels and they lacked contacts within the Spanish regime. This necessity gave the social 
democratic parties that were in government in Europe (especially the SPD) important leverage to 
influence the PSOE’s strategy and political behaviour from this moment onwards, as they were able 
to act as mediators between the Spanish socialists and the government.xc Moreover, the economic, 
technical, political and diplomatic support that the German social democrats could offer via 
governmental channels, the party, trade unions and the Friedrich Ebert Foundationxci was much 
greater than the support that the PSF could provide.xcii  
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The ideas presented by Soares and González made it difficult to establish a common Southern 
European socialist stance on the relations between socialists and communists. Moreover, the meeting 
of the socialists of Southern Europe provoked suspicion within the SI. Some member parties (social 
democrats from Central and Northern Europe, but also the Italian Social Democrat Party) viewed the 
reunion as an attempt to start a new internationalist line that threatened the ideological and organic 
unity of the organisation.xciii The PSF denied this accusation, arguing that the statutes of the SI 
allowed regional consultations between parties and that the meeting at Latche ought to be understood 
in that context.xciv 
 
The End of the Portuguese Revolution. Possibilities and Limits of Southern European Socialism 
In June 1975 the Portuguese Revolution entered a very turbulent phase commonly known as the ‘hot 
summer’ (verão quente). After the elections of April 1975 the PCP and MFA, based on the pact 
signed with the PS on 11 April, considered that the electoral results should not be reflected in the 
composition of the government, and that they were only valid for determining the composition of the 
Constituent Assembly. The PS, using their electoral legitimacy, claimed a leading role in the 
revolution and put pressure on their rivals by organising massive demonstrations across the country. 
Later, the occupation of the socialist newspaper República by the workers’ committee, and the lack 
of satisfactory solutions given to this problem by the Council of the Revolution, led the socialist 
ministers to resign from government in July 1975.xcv 
During this strained situation between July and November, it is possible to perceive an important shift 
in priorities and discourse regarding Portugal within the PSF. If previously the French had been 
promoting the union of the left with the final goal of ensuring that the socialist revolution would 
follow a democratic path, now the priority of the PSF coincided to a greater extent with the objective 
of European social democracy – to establish a representative democratic system in Portugal on the 
basis of the electoral results from April. It was on this basis that the French supported the path to 
socialism in Portugal. 
This change was caused by a combination of three factors: the tumultuous development of the 
revolution, Soares’s rejection of the union of the left in private conversations and European social 
democratic involvement in Portugal. However, in public as well as internally, the PSF justified this 
change by exclusively blaming it on the Portuguese communists. From the perspective of the 
leadership of the PSF, the PCP had been responsible for breaking with the idea of the union of the 
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left by attempting to monopolise the revolution. In these circumstances, ‘who can reproach [the PS] 
over its refusal to negotiate in such a weak position? Had [the PS] any other alternative than calling 
upon the masses, as apparently the scrutiny of 25th April was considered invalid?’xcvi Acknowledging 
the limits of their own strategy in the Portuguese circumstances, the French position was now less 
opposed to that of the European social democrats. 
Between August and September the main leaders of the SI (Harold Wilson, Mário Soares, Bruno 
Kreisky, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, François Mitterrand, Joop den Uyl, Trygve Bratteli, Anker 
Jörgensen and Kalevi Sorsa) met in Stockholm and then in London,xcvii creating the Committee of 
Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal. This committee’s aim was to 
coordinate action among the European socialist and social democrat parties in order to avoid a 
communist takeover in Portugal. Its most immediate objectives were to work towards the 
establishment of a democratic regime in Portugal, the restoration of basic freedoms (especially for 
the press and trade unions) and to fight against Portuguese international isolation. It was also agreed 
that the social democrats should handle European public opinion, explaining their activities as far as 
they could, to create a favourable atmosphere in support of democracy in Portugal. Thus, they also 
wanted to avoid accusations of interference in Portuguese internal affairs, which after the CSCE was 
an especially important issue.xcviii  
After these meetings the strategy of the PSF with regard to Portugal changed. Following the 
objectives agreed at the meeting in Stockholm, the National Secretariat of the PSF sent a circular to 
its militants informing them about the new strategy to follow in Portugal. They were requested to: 
not get involved in any common action with other formations of the left over the Portuguese 
affair. . . . Equally, we ask you not to sign common texts [and] not to have any public common 
meetings, or anything similar, with the other formations that are signatories to the common 
programme. . . . We would like the socialist federations [that] demonstrate on the Portuguese 
situation. . . . [to] insist on the following terms: the reference to universal suffrage should not 
be excluded, even in a revolutionary process such as the one going on in Portugal. The 
revolution should be put at the service of the democratic principles: political pluralism, freedom 
of expression, freedom of reunion, etc. . . . We socialists think that respect for these values, 
even during the development of the revolutionary phase, is indispensable. So too is the 
recognition of the irreversibility of the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.xcix  
The Portuguese events provoked greater agitation than ever within the French party during August, 
and the PSF leadership stopped supporting the union of the left in Portugal if it was not to be achieved 
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on socialist terms. The PSF’s National Secretariat sent updates to the federations and the party 
secretary for propaganda about the strategy to follow. A new circular was sent with more refined 
instructions at the end of August. The leadership of the PSF built a basic argument that was to be 
followed and adopted by the whole party. Following along the abovementioned lines, it consisted of 
publicly stressing the PCP’s sectarianism and anti-unionist behaviour, and emphasising that this not 
only made the union between the PS and PCP difficult but also opened the door to reactionary 
sentiments. Therefore, if the PSF was going to refer to the union of the left, this would be carried out 
bearing in mind that ‘it can only be achieved on the base of democratic principles and with respect 
for universal suffrage’, which meant that the union should be led by the PS. Instead of socialism, ‘the 
content of the union of the left in Portugal has to be democracy’.c 
On 19 September 19 1975 the Sixth Provisional Government was established in Portugal; this 
moment is considered to be the beginning of the end of the revolution. The intervention of the 
moderate faction of the MFA facilitated the creation of a new government that reflected April’s 
electoral results. The PS held five ministries, the PPD two and the PCP only one. Non-communist 
military officers and technocrats held the rest of the ministries. Shortly after the creation of the new 
government the Western powers coordinated their responses to the Portuguese events, and the United 
States and the EEC conceded economic aid to Portugal, conditional to the development of a liberal 
democracy. They also publicly supported a Portuguese request to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for balance of payments aid.ci 
On 4 and 5 October the PSF held a debate on Portugal. The directive committee of the party 
unanimously adopted a resolution. It recommended that Portugal keep the acquis of the revolution 
and ‘hoped that the PS would contribute to healing the relations between the parties of the left, 
creating the conditions of development of the union of the popular forces and ensuring the efficacy 
of the governmental coalition’.cii The leadership of the PSF was aware that the PS would probably 
put an end to the revolution. However, they wondered: ‘do we have the right to [question] the 
authenticity of the PS?’ The answer they came to was negative. They thought that the PS represented 
‘the first manifestation in which a PS has reaffirmed its autonomy in a revolutionary situation without 
succumbing to the social democrat temptation, or to crypto-communist deviation’. Moreover, they 
considered that ‘by itself’, the PS ‘had made the PCP back down without favouring the counter-
revolution’. Accordingly, the PSF’s support for the PS ‘was largely justified’ciii If this was the opinion 
of the majority of the party’s leadership, the CERES was very critical of both the PS and the 
leadership of the PSF and publicly expressed its opinion.civ The CERES thought that ‘the patronage 
[exerted by H. Schmidt and H. Wilson] made the Portuguese PS appear as the vector of a “social 
 17 
democratic” project, which in the current Portuguese conditions means the restoration of 
capitalism’.cv  
 
The PSOE, the PSF and the Continuation of Southern European Socialism  
The Portuguese Revolution seemed to show the limitations of collaboration between socialists and 
communists at a point when marching towards socialism became a real possibility. These events 
raised questions among Southern European socialists about the democratic credibility of the 
communist parties that were labelled euro-communists. Moreover, in 1975 a secret document of the 
PCF from 1972 was published,cvi in which the leader of the party, Georges Marchais, stated that the 
PCF’s programme was superior to the Common Programme of the left, and that his party would work 
to make its own programme prevail. Although the PSF did not overreact to the publication of this 
document,cvii the credibility of the communists was undermined, and relations between socialists and 
communists became especially uneasy. The Portuguese experience also affected how the Spanish 
socialists perceived the ideologically renewed eurocommunists – it made the leaders of the PSOE 
suspicious and even more careful about establishing pacts with the PCE.cviii  
As we saw above, the leaders of the PSF and PSOE began to collaborate over the training of PSOE’s 
militants as early as January 1975. Four months later they worked together to set the Conference of 
Southern European Socialism in motion. However, what had begun as a promising collaboration 
between two ideologically and geographically close parties lost momentum after the Latche meeting. 
From the summer of 1975 onwards the relations between the PSOE and PSF lessened in intensity and 
even deteriorated, in part due to the growing influence of the SPD on the leaders of the PSOE, but 
also due to the inconsistency of the PSF’s support for the Spanish party.  
The impact of the German support for the PSOE is noticeable in the political behaviour of the Spanish 
party from the summer 1975 onwards. Some effects of this support were the PSOE’s increasingly 
amenable stance to negotiate with the regime and its abandonment of the idea of allying with the 
PCE. However, the PSOE still needed to enhance its left-wing image and deal with the dominant 
communists. After privileged relations were established between the SPD and PSOE, the socialists 
began to be criticised by the rest of the socialist opposition for coming close to reformist social 
democracy and having preferential treatment from the government.cix This ‘attempt to distort and 
defame the PSOE’ concerned the party greatly.cx It tried to counter these attacks by, amongst other 
things, publicly emphasising its ideological affinity with the French socialists.cxi  
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However, bilateral relations between the French and the Spanish socialists declined. This 
deterioration was related to the SPD’s desire to prevent the germination of the ideas of the PSF among 
the Spanish socialists, but there were also other reasons. During the whole of 1975 the PSF tactically 
employed its relations with Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the PCE. They paid as much public 
attention to him and other Spanish socialist parties as they did to the PSOE, if not more, which 
provoked the PSOE’s anger. The Spanish explained: ‘we do not think that this is a very clear 
demonstration of the solidarity among socialists . . . perhaps we are still a little QUIJOTE’,cxii meaning 
idealistic and naïve. The inconsistent French attitude towards the PSOE can be plausibly explained 
by observing the complex situation of the French socialists, who were internally divided and also 
confronted by the PCF as a result of the Portuguese events. In this situation, paying special attention 
to the Spanish communists was instrumental to the PSF. It was a way for the French party to minimise 
the criticism from the CERES and PCF for having overtly supported the Portuguese PS against the 
PCP in Portugal. Furthermore, giving visibility and enhancing the euro-communist moderate line 
advocated by Carrillo was a way to criticise the PCF, which had publicly supported the ‘Stalinist’ 
PCP during the Revolution, unlike the PCE.  
After the death of Franco on 20 November 1975 the PSF tried to relaunch cooperation between the 
parties of Southern Europe by organising the first Conference of Southern European Socialist Parties 
in Paris (24 and 25 January 1976).cxiii The initiative was again welcomed by the PSOE. The Spanish 
socialists were interested in the public repercussions of this meeting and in confirming their 
attachment to the Southern European socialist label.cxiv The Portuguese, on the other hand, welcomed 
the initiative but they did not engage with it as closely as the Spanish, as is shown by Mário Soares’s 
absence.  
This was the most ambitious attempt by the PSF to establish a new ideological trend within the SI. 
Their goals for this conference were as follows: 
a) to enhance the originality of the socialist strategies in the south of Europe, underlying the 
points of strength of the French strategy (rupture with the capitalist system, union of the 
Left, common programme); b) to implement a unitary dynamic in the south of Europe, 
involving the trade unions that could play a useful role in finding a meeting point that could 
be ‘European workers and the crisis’; c) to design a foreign policy . . . [that could be titled] 
‘a socialist policy for the Mediterranean’; d) to consider that on these bases, a dialogue with 
the social democracy should be opened.cxv 
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The attempt to create this international trend at this precise moment was very interesting to the French 
because after the publication of the Tindemans Report the future of the EC seemed to be moving 
towards the greater political, economic and social integration of the member states. If the 
competencies of a democratically elected European Parliament were going to be strengthened in the 
near future, the Conference of the Southern European Socialists could be significant for initiating a 
debate from a strong position against the social democrats on the ideas of socialism, the union of the 
left and the building of a social Europe.cxvi The French considered that ‘it is important popularise the 
union of the left in Europe and in the world and to engage the debate with Northern Europe clearly 
on this point’.cxvii  
However, five days before the beginning of the Conference there was a Bureau meeting of the SI in 
Helsingør (Denmark), at which all of the socialist leaders of Western Europe discussed the relations 
between socialists and communists.cxviii The discussion was heated and Mitterrand clashed with 
Helmut Schmidt. The French argued that the only way to build a socialist society in freedom was by 
making a pact with the communists. Moreover, Mitterrand considered that the socialists could only 
reach government in the south of Europe through such pacts. Schmidt, in turn, accused the parties of 
Southern Europe of putting European unity and the politico-military equilibrium of the West in 
danger by making a pact with the communists. This meeting set the tone for the development of the 
Conference of the Southern European Socialists.   
Once in Paris the PSOE had to present the most controversial and heated topic of the Conference: the 
relations between socialists and communists. The PSOE’s secretary of press and information Alfonso 
Guerra presented a paper titled ‘Coordinating Action Between the Different Forces of the Left in the 
South of Europe’. He argued that despite the problems for the union of the left in the Southern 
European countries, ‘the union is necessary, now more than ever’. His reasoning was that in order to 
advance to socialism, ‘it is not [enough] to gain only 51 per cent of the vote in an election. It is 
necessary to have the support of multiple layers of society to sustain the political project proposed by 
the left.’ In order to carry out this unification project, the PSOE considered collaboration between the 
following elements to be indispensable: ‘a) the socialist parties of the different countries; b) between 
socialists and communists; c) with [other] progressive forces (Christians, radicals, etc.); d) with the 
trade unions’. Consequently, in order to advance in this direction, the PSOE proposed regular 
meetings between the socialist parties of Southern Europe.cxix 
The text presented by the PSOE was congruent with the ideological development of the party since 
its renovation in 1972–4. Nevertheless, to get the full picture of the PSOE’s position at this 
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Conference, González’s speech at the inauguration has to be taken into consideration, as he added 
nuance to some of Guerra’s statements. First of all, González tried to make it clear that the Conference 
did not imply any attempt at breaking up the relations between the Southern European socialist parties 
and the Northern European social democrat parties. In fact, he tried to build bridges, stating that the 
aim of all of these parties was to build a socialist and democratic Europe, which could only be attained 
through ‘the decisive confluence of the socialist and social democrat parties’. Regarding the union of 
the left in Spain, González developed and nuanced Guerra’s statements, highlighting Spain’s specific 
position of being under a dictatorship. An agreement with all of the democratic forces was an 
overriding necessity for his party but only until democracy was reached. Thus, González postponed 
any decision on the union of the left in Spain until democracy had arrived. In the current 
circumstances he considered that an exclusive union between socialists and communists in Spain 
would not be possible because of the reaction that it could provoke among the right-wing, which 
‘enjoys a very solid support from the army’.cxx 
If we are to evaluate the significance of the conference in terms of the development of a common 
socialist strategy to relate to the communists, or to develop a new path towards socialism, the results 
were disappointing. In all of the presentations at the conference the theoretical need for the union of 
the left was acknowledged to a greater or lesser extent, but it only existed in France, and the specific 
situations of the other socialist parties in their own countries seemed to make it very difficult to 
achieve a common stance on this issue. On top of all this, there was hostility within the SI, aroused 
by the creation of a new socialist brand that was favourable to the union of the left. 
However, if we are to evaluate the significance of the conference in terms of gaining international 
legitimacy and enhancing the electoral image of the parties involved, it could be considered a success, 
especially if we take into account that the parties tried to keep the Southern European socialist brand 
alive, holding a second conference in Madrid in May 1977,cxxi and, after some years of interruption, 
other conferences in the early 1980s. The nature of the event changed completely, however. The 
relations between socialists and communists had been the reason for the first conference, but in 
Madrid the union of the left was not mentioned at all. The main idea of the Madrid conference was 
linking democracy and socialism, which was carried out by emphasising and developing the concept 
of ‘self management’ (autogestión). In the 1980s the disagreements regarding tactic and strategy 
between the parties involved were so great that they could only agree on focusing on international 
policy, which they claimed should be guided by the vague principles of ‘peace, security and human 
rights’.cxxii  
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Finally, it is difficult to assess the relevance that the creation of the Southern European socialist trend 
had for rebalancing the forces within the left in the region. However, the fact that these parties kept 
alive the Southern European socialist label until 1981 – always celebrating a conference immediately 
before an election in one of the Southern European countries –cxxiii and that all of them went from 
being organisationally and/or electorally weaker than the communists in the early–1970s to being 
dominant in the early–1980s, suggests that building Southern European socialism might have been a 
relevant factor contributing to this rebalancing of forces. For the PSF, the creation of this trend helped 
them to legitimise its domestic strategy internationally. For the PS and PSOE, this label was useful 
for building a leftist identity, which was important for them in the context of competition for the 
hegemony within the left. Furthermore, it could be argued that the creation of this trend to a certain 
extent triggered the reaction of German social democracy, which increased its support to the Iberian 
socialist parties immediately after the first meeting of Southern European socialist parties in Latche. 
The combination of these two factors surely contributed greatly to rebalancing the forces within the 
Iberian left. 
Conclusion 
During 1974–6, the crucial years during which the Iberian dictatorships came to an end, the Spanish 
and Portuguese socialists were very attentive to the ideological guidance of the PSF. This was because 
the French party offered an interesting example of competitive collaboration with a stronger 
communist party, as well as an ideological line that respected democracy and freedom but aimed to 
break with capitalism and implant socialism. At the same time, the PSF actively promoted a new 
ideological line among the Iberian socialists. This Southern European Socialism held the core idea of 
the union of the left. Although the PSOE and PS initially welcomed this idea, the development of the 
Portuguese revolution in the context of Cold War détente showed the limitations to applying this 
strategy outside France, as the PSF acknowledged. Furthermore, the suspicion that was created among 
European social democrats by the French attempt to patronise the Iberian socialists, and the decisive 
support that member parties of the SI, such as the SPD, provided to the PS and PSOE in order to 
strengthen their moderate line prevented this strategy from being further considered.  
Thus, already in 1975 the Portuguese and Spanish socialists rejected the French way of competing 
against the communists and opted for alternative ways to establish the hegemony among the left, 
supported by the main European social democrat parties. However, although they did not follow the 
strategy of their French counterparts, their association with the PSF – especially the radical image 
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that Southern European Socialism could provide – was relevant to them. At different moments during 
the Iberian transitions, the Spanish and Portuguese socialists sought to publicly highlight their 
closeness to the PSF in order to counteract the criticism coming from other compatriot left-wing 
parties for being excessively moderate.  
Finally, this article has not only shown the relevance and limits of the collaboration between these 
parties, it has also demonstrated that the party leaders had the possibility to choose alternatives that 
differed from the path promoted by the Northern social democrats. Despite the several national (not 
included here, but fully discussed in the literature quoted in this article) and international constraints 
that they found for developing the political plans designed in the early 1970s, during the transitions 
there were different ways of action and models available to them that eventually were not chosen. 
This implies that the path that they decided to take was neither natural nor inevitable.  
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